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Abstract 
 
Recent research in the area of standards accreditation has shown that the rate of take 
up of the ISO27001 (Information Security Management) by organisations been 
disappointing in many Western countries, compared to the picture emerging in Asia, 
and the rollout of previous international standards that relate to information 
management, such as ISO9001. 
 
In this paper, a researcher and a practitioner from the UK investigate possible reasons 
for a lesser interest in pursuing certification for organisational Information Security 
Management Systems (ISMS) across Western countries. They also share their 
perceptions and concerns that current attitudes of UK of small businesses regarding 
complying with standards and legislation means that they may be taking unnecessary 
risks with their corporate and personal data under the possibly misguided notion that 
other priorities are more important during these current recessionary times. 
 
The authors use an economics-based approach in proposing a solution to the problem. 
On the one hand they review the research that has provided methods for putting a 
figure on the value of corporate and personal data in larger organisations, and 
applying the principles of managing information risk as appropriate to SMEs. On the 
other hand they look at economics-related issues such as market pressure, insurance, 
outsourcing, and the legal and regulatory matters regarding privacy of personal data. 
The result provides a case for showing SMEs that, apart from the moral matter of 
being “good for the business”, there are very sound economic reasons for an SME 
developing an ISMS and getting ISO27001 certified.  
 
SME, Information Risk Management, ISMS, Information Security Management 
Systems, Data Protection Legislation, Economics of Information Security, Value of 
Data, ISO27001, PCI DSS, Drivers for Accreditation 
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Introduction 
   “Information is the new currency of business - a critical corporate asset whose value 
rises and falls at different times, and in different ways, depending on when, how, 
where and by whom it is placed into circulation as a medium of exchange. 
Therein lie the risks. And the opportunities.” 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2008, p.1) 
   So large organizations may be recognizing that the world of doing business has 
changed, that good management of their digital information is a key factor to success.  
However, the extent to which this message is filtering through to SMEs (Small and 
Medium Sized Enterprises) is not well researched. This paper will look comparatively 
at how widely the Information Security Management System (ISMS) model is being 
adopted across Europe and globally. It also looks at recent trends in the UK and 
elsewhere in view of the recession and takes a preliminary view of the drivers for 
robust organizational ISMS, and how they might, or might not, influence SMEs. 
 
The drivers for organisations to develop an ISMS and get it certified 
   “Economics of Information Security” was initiated by a debate on organisational 
spending on security (Anderson, 2002; Schneier, 2002), to investigate economic 
factors driving the development of organisational ISMSs. Subsequently, researchers 
have identified a number of issues that organizations need to look out for when 
consider whether or not to spend more on Information Security, and can be considered 
as drivers towards compliance and certification to the ISO27001 standard. An 
alternative research approach to ISMS development is “Human Factors in Information 
Security”, and this has grown in parallel. 
   The first thing to note about organisational ISMS development is that it can be an 
expensive undertaking, which needs financial justification. The authors of this paper 
would wish that organizations would recognize the main driver towards an ISMS as 
“because it is good for the business”. Maybe one day that will be the case, but all 
business costs need to be justified, and that includes ISMS development. It therefore 
makes sense in the interim to use an economics approach, and find reasons to develop 
an ISMS that contributes towards profitability..  
   As Bartlette & Fomin (2008) discovered, surprisingly little Economics of 
Information Security research to date has focussed on ISMS certification or how 
economics may particularly impinge on the unique environment of an SME. In their 
fascinating paper, they briefly considered factors that might explain the low 
ISO27001 accreditation rates within organisations, and the apparent anomaly 
compared to what could be perceived as a rush for compliance with other international 
standards such as ISO9001. However, when seeking explanations in their subsequent 
paper, they mainly identified possible “human factor” drivers (or barriers) and 
acknowledged that more research was urgently needed.  
   As the current paper focuses on SMEs, it will seek explanations in terms of the 
economic motivators that have been identified by researchers as influencing 
organisational decision-making. These are listed below, will be considered in turn:  
I. Legal and Regulatory (avoiding fines; retaining right to trade) 
II. Protection of Reputation & Brand (reputation damage; lose market share) 
III. Market Pressure (risk of loss of customers) 
IV. Physical Cost of a Data Breach 
V. Loss in stock market value if a breach is publicized  
VI. Insurance premiums (higher as a result of data breach) 
VII       Outsourcing (possibly increased chance of a data breach)   
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Measuring ISMS activity 
   We could have adopted two possible approaches, and both are considered here.  
1. We could choose information security policy as the measure 
This is a measure popularly used by information security surveys (positive outcome = 
the policy document). A number of options are already available for gathering data 
about organisations and information security policies. Firstly, many statistics are 
provided by government-based organisations such as BERR in the UK (BERR, 2008), 
or other national statistics. One problem here was that the questions asked in the 
surveys didn’t seem to be quite the same, making direct comparison difficult. The 
worldwide surveys by Ernst and Young (2008) and the more independent Ponemon 
Institute (PGP, 2009) seemed more useful because the same questions were being 
asked in different countries.  
2. We could use choosing an ISMS as the measure 
  An ISMS is an implementation of a model for managing information security within 
an organisation. This is a complex matter, and every organisation is unique. Over the 
last twenty years or so, a tremendous amount of work and expertise has gone into 
developing a number of different, or related, models for managing an organisation’s 
information systems. Ever more elaborate and sophisticated models emerged to reflect 
different types of organisations and different complexities of networks and 
internetworks. Just choosing, or “registering” an ISMS = positive outcome. However, 
according to a recent researcher this would be far from a useful measure… 
“… registering an ISMS still says nothing about the quality and performance of its 
implementation. Therefore, in this article, a method for measuring the performance of 
the implementation and operation of an ISMS is presented” (Boehmer, 2008, abstract) 
3. We could choose ISMS accreditation as the measure 
  This approach has been avoided in the global surveys. (different models became 
popular in different countries; standards often used for benchmarking but a decision 
made not to become certified; no universally accepted measure) 
  However, as time has moved on, thankfully there has been a convergence of opinion 
amongst researchers and practitioners as regards what constitutes a robust ISMS and 
the various stages necessary for an organisation to acquire that robustness. The 
achievement of that robustness and effectiveness was rewarded by accreditation by 
one of a number of bodies such as ISACA, BSI (UK), BIAS (Germany), ISO, etc…    
  One possible way to obtain meaningful data for a country with so many 
organisations awarding information security management accreditation would be to 
sum up the outputs from a number of different certifications bodies. However, this 
would have been highly time-consuming and didn’t really combine like with like. 
Also, which of the certifications on offer really met up to the definition of a standard? 
As the computer networks guru Andrew Tanenbaum cynically told us in his textbook 
“Computer Networks”: 
‘‘The nice thing about standards is that there are so many to choose from. And if you 
really don’t like all the standards you just have to wait another year until the one 
arises you are looking for.’’ 
(Tanenbaum, 1988, p. 254) 
  We didn’t have the luxury of waiting that extra year, so we looked closely at 
currently available standards (rather than methodologies) for an ISMS. The most 
popular candidates were COBIT and ISO27001. Which to choose? Thankfully, other 
researchers before us have stated that: 
“The Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology (COBIT) as well as 
the IT Infrastructure Library (ITIL) are often mentioned in connection with IT 
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security.  Though the outcome of their implementation supports a company in 
establishing secure information systems, their main content deals with different 
matters, hence they have not been counted as IS standards...” 
(Kluge & Sambasivam, 2008, p.2)  
“… All other before mentioned standards including ITIL and COBIT and 
Grundschutz refer to ISO 27001 when it comes to certification (Szakats 2004; ISACA 
2007; FOIS 2004).”   (Kluge & Sambasivam, 2008, p.3) 
  This left little doubt that, if we were to use ISMS accreditation as our measure, 
ISO27001 certification would the most suitable single measure to use. 
 
Choice of Methodology 
   Choice 2 seemed totally inappropriate because the data didn’t give any indication 
about operational level.  
   This would probably also be the case for choice 1, but at least the matter of base 
level engagement/non-engagement was a potentially worthwhile measure. One 
disadvantage of using this measure would be that any research we carried out using 
other surveys would be secondary and would not necessarily provide a helpful picture 
for country-by-country comparison. Although detailed and interesting, these surveys 
also only provided a snapshot of the situation at a point in time, annually or 
biannually, which wouldn’t be so useful for purposes of comparison and recent trends.  
Furthermore, we had our concerns about the validity of such data, for our purposes. 
   Recent survey results are held by their authors to be encouraging, showing a 
progressive increase in the percentage of organisations having devised a written 
information security policy. However, the focus is the existence of a policy document, 
and that measure gives no indication as to how that policy is effectively being 
implemented. Studies elsewhere in Europe (e.g. Kluge and Sambasivam, 2008) and 
anecdotal evidence obtained from businesses locally in the UK has suggested that an 
organisation merely saying on an online survey that they have an information security 
policy doesn’t actually amount to very much on its own, and a yes/no response may 
present a more optimistic picture of developments towards an ISMS than is actually 
the case. We deduced that this type information security survey would be fine for 
capturing qualitative data, but would not be most appropriate for our current 
investigations. 
   Choice 3 was attractive partly because it was quantitative and we had ready access 
to the raw data, already categorised as country-by-country (ISMS, 2009). Provided 
that the data was “picked” at suitable time intervals we could make direct month-by-
month comparisons.  
  We finally agreed that the best focus would be to choose the relevant ISO standard 
for ISMS, ISO27001. The actual measure used in our analysis would be the numbers 
of ISO27001 certificates awarded monthly, in each country, as the effects of the 
recession began to be felt by organisations and their workforces. Also, we felt, an 
output measured against an exacting standard is a much more meaningful benchmark 
than the existence of an unaudited document. Firstly because it actually means 
something in operating terms, and secondly because evidence of operational success 
of the output must also be available to the scrutiny of external audit before an 
ISO27001 certificate is awarded. 
 
Data Used in the survey      
  The figures for ISMS being used in this study reflect the time from which the 
recession properly started and the end of June 2009. As the effects of the recession are 
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only just being fully realised, it would not be wise to make speculative projections 
about future trends for ISO certification based on future projections of economic 
growth. They are interesting not just longitudinally, for the trends over time in a 
particular country, but also horizontally for the wide discrepancies across different 
countries.  
   The total US figure may be not be an accurate reflection, because larger numbers of 
companies have used non-ISO27001 series bodies to accredit a robust ISMS. 
However, the trend in that country is still worth noting. 
   For the rest of the world ISO27001 does seem to be the favoured option, and the 
differences between developed countries are very marked. Two aspects of the data 
worth noting are: 
(i)  differences in numbers of certificates awarded within the 27 states that currently 
make up the EU. 
(ii) higher levels of accreditation in many East Asian countries compared with 
elsewhere in the world 
 
(i) Differences within Europe 
To demonstrate (i), we chose ISO certification figures awarded within that country for 
twelve fairly representative European countries up to June 2009. We could have 
chosen a different month, but scrutiny of the data for other months showed that the 
differences would have been similar. Results are shown below (table 1): 
 
Country Total no. of ISO27001 
certificates 
Austria 30 
Czech Republic 82 
France 12 
Germany 120 
Greece 22 
Hungary 65 
Ireland 29 
Italy 56 
Poland 40 
Slovakia 7 
Spain 36 
UK 402 
Table 1: ISO27001 data for some European  
Countries taken at the end of June 2009 
 
   As can be clearly seen, the UK has a much higher figure than any other state. By 
contrast, certain of the smaller Eastern European states have absolute figures greater 
than large states such as France or Italy.  If population is also taken into consideration, 
so that figure for each country is certificates per capita, the “Eastern Europe” and 
“English-speaking” effects are even more marked (table 2, table 3, graph 1, graph 2): 
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“Mature” EU countries 
Country Total no. of 
ISO27001 
certificates 
ISO27001 
certificates per 
capita 
Austria 30 0.0000649 
France 12 0.0000018 
Germany 120 0.0000146 
Greece 22 0.0000195 
Ireland 29 0.0000642 
Italy 56 0.0000093 
Spain 36 0.0000079 
UK 402 0.0000652 
Table 2: ISO27001 data per capita for  
    pre-2005 European Countries  
taken at the end of June 2009 
 
New EU Countries 
Country Total no. of 
ISO27001 
certificates 
ISO27001 
certificates per 
capita 
Czech Republic  82 0.0000783 
Hungary  65 0.0000648 
Poland  40 0.0000105 
Slovakia 7 0.0000129 
Table 3: ISO27001 data per capita for  
    post-2005 European Countries  
taken at the end of June 2009 
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   The above figures show a per capita difference of over 40x between the best 
performing country (Czech Republic) and the worst country (France) in terms of 
ISO27001 certificates awarded.  
   Some interesting possible trends are emerging here. Firstly, English-speaking 
countries seem to have much higher levels of ISMS per capita than the average for the 
EU. Secondly, a cluster of countries in central Europe (Austria, Czech Republic, 
Hungary) also seem to have much higher levels ISO27001 certificates per capita than 
might be expected. 
   The authors of this paper contend that ISO27001 is considered to be the best ISMS 
standard available, that organisations should be encouraged to strive towards this 
standard. In our opinion, many EU countries are falling well behind the best practice, 
and those doing well should be encouraged to share good practice with those who are 
below the average. Perhaps this is a matter that may be of interest to ENISA 
(European Network and Information Security Agency). 
(ii) Statistics for ISO27001 take up globally  
   It was interesting to compare statistics for the different continents, both in terms of 
total numbers of certificates and in more absolute terms as certificates awarded per 
capita. Again, the most recent figures (June 2009) are chosen here, but other months 
show a similar pattern. These are absolute figures, not per capita 
Continent/area No. of certificates 
Africa 11 
Asia (Middle East) 77 
Asia 4411 
Australasia 30 
Europe 1002 
North America 127 
South America 35 
Table 4: ISO27001 data for different  
continents taken at the end of June 2009 
   As with European figures, the variations were considerable, but this is much more 
as expected because of the greater difference in GDP of these continents. What is 
noteworthy is the very high figure for Asia. 
   Asia is a very large continent. To investigate further, particular “exemplar” 
developed countries within and outside Asia were chosen to compare the effects per 
capita already perceived with the European statistics (Table 5, illustrated in Chart 2). 
Country No. of ISO27001 
certificates 
No. of ISO27001 
certificates per capita 
Australia 29 0.0000133 
Brazil 22 0.0000012 
Canada 5 0.0000015 
China 199 0.0000015 
India 454 0.0000039 
Japan 3191 0.0002500 
Russian Federation 10 0.0000007 
Taiwan 325 0.0001411 
South Africa 5 0.0000010 
United States 94 0.0000031 
Table 5: ISO27001 data per capita for chosen non-European  
countries taken at the end of June 2009 
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   The figures taken from Table 5, and illustrated in Chart 2 show some quite 
astonishing differences, revealing where much of the Asian growth is and is not 
taking place. They show that Asia/Far East countries like Japan and Taiwan are quite 
clearly leading the rest of the world in the development of organisational ISMSs.   
The reasons why Japan and parts of the Pacific rim should be so advanced in terms of 
certificating their ISMSs is worthy of investigation because the results of such a study 
may lead to greater understanding of the wider organisational problems affecting 
global information security.  
 
Statistics for ISO27001 take up in different countries as the recession started to 
take effect 
  Although economic activity has been falling in recent months, it is interesting to 
look at trends in ISO27001 growth, as a measure of the extent to which the recession 
has been hitting progress with the development of more robust information security 
management systems.  
  As previously stated, with the exception of the US, GDP comparison figures for 
different countries started to become negative during the latter half of 2008. Figures 
obtained for ISO27001 certificates issued over all countries in recent months can 
therefore be related directly to the fluctuating GDP in that country to see whether the 
recession is indeed having an effect. 
  Thankfully, records of ISO27001 certificates issued have been issued on a monthly 
basis since late 2008 (for latest see ISMS, 2009), so it was possible to make a 
comparative study of individual countries and continents over a period of several 
months.  
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Continent/area Dec 08 Feb 09 Apr 09 June 09 
Africa 8 9 11 11 
Asia (Middle East) 66 67 70 77 
Asia 3868 4053 4110 4411 
Australasia 29 29 30 30 
Europe 874 909 973 1002 
North America 104 107 108 127 
South America 34 32 34 35 
Table 6: Total ISO27001 certificates awarded on different continents/areas since 
the recession started to have a global effect 
    
  Analysis of the results of this unique study show the following trends in ISMS 
development behaviour as the recession has taken effect around the world: 
1. Growth is continuing at a slow, but steady rate in Europe, in spite of the recession 
2. Growth is continuing at a fairly fast rate in Asia, particularly around the Pacific 
rim, and again in spite of the recession  
3. Other continents have much slower growth 
  This presents a complex picture and it is difficult to draw specific conclusions. 
Although countries are already emerging from recession, the full effects on ISO 
certification rates may not yet have filtered through to because it can take one year or 
more for an organisation to go through the whole process of developing/implementing 
an ISMS. Organisations becoming certified now may have started their project 6 – 24 
months ago. In countries where motivation is purely cash flow and profitability it may 
be expected that the state of the economy will have a significant effect. However 
those countries where culturally the motivations for information security may be more 
aligned to CSR, ethics, personal shame, etc may not see such a strong link with 
current recession concerns. 
 
Why such big differences in ISO27001 take up in different countries with similar 
GDP regardless of the recession? 
  The announcement of the ISO27001 ISMS standard (ISO, 2005) received 
considerable acclaim, and was recommended in a significant UN report (UN, 2005). 
A number of researchers helpfully provided evidence why ISO27001 and the formal 
adoption of an ISMS approach would be helpful to organisations, and why it may 
provide a cost-effective long-term solution (e.g. Coles-Kemp & Overill, 2007). More 
recently, researchers (Bartlette & Fomin, 2008) have commented on the disappointing 
growth levels of ISO27001 certificates awarded in EU countries compared to other 
International standards such as ISO9001, and broadened their study the following year 
(Fomin, de Vries, & Barlette, 2008). The current paper uses more detailed data; 
perceived differences between apparently similarly developed countries will be 
analysed from an economic perspective, and in terms of the needs of SMEs. Many 
developed countries have 75-80% of their GDP created by SMEs, and the drop in 
output during a recession will include a drop in SME output. Whilst the rest of this 
study may be inconclusive about effects of the recession, it has revealed some 
fascinating anomalies between countries, which may be of use to practitioners in those 
countries where ISMS growth is currently very low. 
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Economic Drivers for ISMS development/certification 
  The rest of the paper will focus on economic drivers for organisations and look at 
how these drivers may or may not have importance in particular parts of the world. 
 
(1) Legal and Regulatory Drivers 
  The recent Ernst & Young (2008) survey noted that regulatory compliance has been 
the leading driver for information security since 2005. Although this is about the time 
that organizations would be considering starting to work towards the then new 
ISO27001 certificates, no regulatory or statutory legislation specifically mandates 
ISO27001. Most require “reasonable & appropriate” measures to be taken. ISO27001 
is seen as a benchmark of taking reasonable and appropriate measures.  
  Three legal and regulatory drivers can readily be identified:  
(a) data protection legislation 
(b) privacy disclosure legislation 
(c) on-line credit card use security framework, known as PCI DSS.  
  Of these, the first two are country-specific, but the last is global. 
 
(a) Data Protection Legislation in the UK, and elsewhere in Europe 
   A summary of the UK Data Protection Act is provided as appendix 1. These 
changes were brought about in anticipation of a seven-year holiday of prosecution 
ending in 2005. The UK data processing law is generally accepted, even by the ICO 
(Information Commissioners Office) itself, as being among the weakest in the EU. 
The reasons for that are social and political as well as economic and beyond the scope 
of this paper. A comparative study covering SME practice in dealing with personal 
data covering several European nations from the 1981 EU directive to present day 
would be very useful in this regard. However, the repercussions of not doing so 
according to stronger data protection legislation elsewhere in Europe has not 
sufficiently motivated those responsible for securing data to do so to stop or reduce 
the incidence of data breaches occurrence. 
    A similar pattern of personal data protection occurs in many developed countries. 
Some examples are given below: 
Japan has progressively exercised more central control: 
1998: The Privacy Issues Study Working Group produced 'Guidelines concerning 
Protection of Personal Data in Electronic Commerce'.  
2000: Another Study Group on Personal Data Protection produced an Interim Report  
2003: Personal Data Protection Legislation Special Committee formulated a legal 
framework and the Personal Information Protection Law 
2005: Personal Information Protection Law obligations of businesses took effect  
(Pishvar et al, 2007)  
Turkey introduced data protection legislation in 2003, probably to bring that country 
closer to Europe. Effects on controls on information security are discussed by Cebi et 
al, (2007). 
Canada acted to protect data earlier than the EU, in 1980, and adjusted laws to bring 
them in line with Europe to allow free trade in 2002.  
Data Protection Laws can of course only be effective if there is a sizeable chance of 
being caught, and the fines imposed are significant.  
United States has no specific Data Protection legislation was passed by the senate, 
but the HIPPA act (1996) was brought in to safeguard and protect healthcare data. In 
2002, they introduced the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) legislation (US Federal 
Government, 2002), protecting financial data. 
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(b) Privacy Disclosure Legislation 
  The State of California introduced data disclosure legislation soon after SOX, and 
other US states followed suit over the following years, which may again explain why 
the Ernst & Young study regarded 2005 as being a significant legislative year. 
Because there was no data protection act in the US, personal data (other than financial 
and healthcare data) had no protection at all before SOX came into being.  
  Some businesses did not and do not like the SOX legislation, and wish even now to 
see it removed on the grounds that it costs the businesses money that they cannot 
afford to pay during the recession. This reinforced the worry implied in the title of this 
paper that businesses would prefer not to spend money on information security, and 
the recession might give them that excuse not to do so – or to delay setting up an 
ISMS until the economy has picked up. 
  Perhaps surprisingly, organisational objections to SOX have recently been used by 
the UK ICO to support a lobby to prevent the introduction of similar disclosure 
legislation throughout the EU by 2012, although debate on this matter continues. In 
any case, this legislation is not about to happen and is unlikely to have an immediate 
impact on businesses. 
(c) Credit Card Regulations, PCI DSS 
  The Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council (essentially Visa and Master 
Card) first introduced a set of guidelines known as PCI DSS (Payment Card Industry 
Data Security Standard) for the beginning of… 2005. Now, after several years, they 
have taken many organisations “off guard” by choosing to enforce the regulatory 
aspect worldwide from 1st October 2009. This change was announced in September 
2008 giving an organisation working from scratch one year to develop an ISMS to 
meet the guidelines. It is interesting, but perhaps coincidental, that PCI DSS was 
tightened at the same time that the recession started to effect business outputs. It could 
be that in the short-term the recessionary and PCI DSS effects will cancel each other 
out in terms of the rate of uptake of ISO27001 certification. The longer term effects of 
PCI DSS can only be speculated, but it seems likely that this will be a powerful ISMS 
driver globally for any organisation that deals with payment by credit card and has not 
made the required efforts to comply with standards or legislation (PCI Security 
Standards Council LLC, 2008). PCI DSS is nothing like as stringent as ISO 27001 
and uses a different methodology, but some organisations may take the opportunity to 
develop an ISMS that meets the requirements of the ISO27001 standard. 
 
(2) Protecting Reputation and Brand 
  The Ernst & Young survey (2008) reported that protection of reputation and brand 
has increased considerably since their 2007 survey. It therefore appears that this has 
become a significant driver for information security. This could partly be a 
consequence of the Californian “disclosure” law relating to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
and partly because of a concern about bad publicity as a result of the media exposure 
that would follow a data breach (HMSO, 2007). 
  However, it could also be a result of the good publicity gained from becoming 
certified. For example, from the evidence of at least one Japanese company report 
(Sony Financial Holdings, 2008), getting ISO27001 accreditation during 2007 is 
considered with pride as positive news to report to shareholders. It appears that this is 
currently a cultural matter, but could be a future driver for Western companies to 
contemplate. 
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(3) Market Pressure 
  If market rivals are gaining customers as a result of getting and advertising 
ISO27001 certification, pressure comes to bear to do likewise. The example quoted 
above provides evidence that ISO27001 is being proclaimed in Japan (Sony Financial 
Holdings, 2008), although this seems currently more to be an issue of boosting the 
brand rather than in response to the action of market rivals. If Sony Financial 
Holdings’ market rivals have moved towards ISO27001 certification recently, then 
market pressure could be a factor. The combined effects of improving the brand with 
ISO27001 and market pressure to compete will together act as powerful drivers 
towards certification. 
  Also, if business supply chain partners require ISO27001 certification, that will 
provide a reason to move towards being certified. More research required to see 
whether this is affecting certification behaviour in Japan. 
(4) Physical Cost of a Breach 
  This is the powerful ROI (Return on Investment) argument, with the suggestion that, 
over a period of time, compliance will have the effect of saving money. Even before 
“Economics of Information Security” research became available, it was possible to 
provide qualitative data that would support the concept that specific spending on 
protecting large company data made good common sense. The question now was… 
how much should they spend to safeguard their data? The data breach protection as a 
ROI argument can only work if a data breach is taken as a medium-term statistical 
certainty if protection is inadequate. 
  Prior to 2002, the physical cost of losing digital data was often never really assessed, 
and possibly regarded as negligible. An ROI argument was therefore difficult to 
justify without evidence. However, in recent years, when huge amounts of data can be 
stored on a portable medium, more enlightened organisations have acknowledged that 
there may be a sizeable cost involved in gathering and maintaining their data, and in 
data recovery if corporate data is lost. Such organisations rightly regarded such data 
as an asset, the protection of which should automatically be factored into any risk 
assessment process. Once an organisation had got to the stage of involving 
information in a risk assessment, it was already on a recognised path towards 
developing an ISMS. A number of researchers were able to move the knowledge base 
forward in this area; particularly influential was the work of Gordon & Loeb (2002), 
which, in their own words: 
“… presents an economic model that determines the optimal amount to invest to 
protect a given set of information.”     
(Gordon & Loeb, 2002, abstract) 
  As the discipline moved forward, not only was it possible to establish that a data 
breach involving corporate data will have a financial impact, but Professor Ioannidis 
(2005) derived a formula to quantify this. Also, Acquisti et al (2006) built on 
Campbell et al’s earlier work and did some ground-breaking research in providing a 
formula for estimating the cost of a corporate data breach on an organisation’s stock 
market price. Rowe & Gallaher (2006) wrote about return of investment by an 
organisation also including contributing to knowledge (the public good) through 
focusing on costs in this way. This is fine for larger corporate organisations that can 
give something back to a wider community, and support organisations wishing to 
promote and mitigate against the social effects of Cyber crime. However, it is 
doubtful whether, without external encouragement, such altruism would be high 
priority for an SME. 
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   It has not been particularly well publicised that formulae are indeed available to 
SMEs to estimate the cost of data breach. In our view, it is also helpful to analyse 
SME data as personal and corporate data, looking at the various consequences of 
losing each type, and gauging singularly and in total the impact of losses on 
profitability. For example, a single record can now be given a value based on current 
estimates of its black market value. Applying a conservative value of - say £50 - to a 
personal data record even a small company can rapidly become aware that the 
contents of its customers database has a considerable value. The typical SME could 
equally suffer loss or corruption of customer data, of organisational data, or both. 
SMEs are indeed collectively in a position to be able to provide useful data to 
researchers, assuming that the data obtained would be suitably anonymised before 
being used. However, within the harsh reality of the SME, and their owners, 
motivations may be economic to the extent that they are more interested in their own 
future profitability than in helping other organisations: 
“SME’s are usually run by entrepreneurs who view information systems and 
technology as tools that can be used to assist in running a business more efficiently.” 
 Upfold & Sewry (2005) 
They would expect government-backed bodies to assist and encourage any such 
engagement, and provide relevant information. 
(5) Effect on Stock Market Value  
  A year after Gordon & Loeb produced their landmark 2002 study; the same authors 
working with Campbell published clear evidence that data breaches could also affect a 
company’s stock market price (Campbell et al, 2003). Although the drop may only be 
short-lived, it could affect public confidence and reduce sales. Since 2007, public 
sensitivity to loss of their data has increased, and effects could be more dramatic. 
(6) Effect on Insurance Premiums 
  The idea of insuring against data loss is examined by Kesan et al, 2005, and would 
appeal to any organisation. However, now that calculations involving risk of data loss 
are available, the process is considered by some to be analytical enough to consider an 
actuarial approach to providing information risk insurance premiums (Herath & 
Herath, 2007). 
(7) Outsourcing 
  This has particular financial attractions for SMEs, and further attractions for those 
not wishing to engage too much with the ever-changing technology. This could be 
perceived as a way of cutting costs by a business seeking to keep expenditure to a 
minimum. However, the research findings of Khalfan (2004) suggested that such an 
approach may have a negative effect on information security, and the “false economy” 
of increased chance of data breach should again be factored in.  
  The same sort of arguments should be applied to the current vogue of “outsourcing 
to the cloud”, a topic getting a lot of attention and of interest to SMEs because it 
renews the “expenditure reduction” allure of outsourcing in general. In practice, all 
types of outsourcing require third party risk management, and cloud computing is no 
exception. However, this can only be done accurately if the value of the information 
asset is reasonably assessed. 
 
ISMS “maturity” modelling for SMEs: moving beyond the costs of Losing Data 
towards an acceptance that “it is good for the business” 
  It has been clearly identified in the research that the smaller the business, the less 
likelihood there is that they will undertake information risk analysis (Dimopoulos et 
al, 2004). Research suggests that an increasing number of businesses have an 
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Information Security Policy but does not investigate the issues involved in requiring 
an SME to undertake information risk analysis, and there is the problem with 
progression beyond that first stage. The current situation for SMEs in the UK (a better 
than average country in terms of ISO27001 certification) was summed up in the 
following way by Bruce Hallas, one of the authors of this paper during a seminar for 
the ESRC (Economics and Social Research Council) at HP Labs last year: 
 
“… SMEs are particularly prone to poor or even non-existent information security. As 
awareness of the importance of information security increases, the SMEs stand to lose 
competitiveness, potentially losing contracts with existing clients and suffering the 
financial consequences that are increasingly arising from information security 
incidents."        (ESRC, 2008, p.1) 
    
  SMEs have typically been less likely to be dependent on complex information 
systems, and some may even still employ the old practices of filing corporate data 
away safely in a lockable cabinet. However, an increasing number of SMEs do now 
use online shopping, keep electronic customer records, and allow payment by credit 
card. In these recessionary times, when they are strongly in competition for market 
share of a dwindling cake, a PCI DSS breach could put an SME out of business. They 
may not afford ISO27001, but at least an information risk assessment is needed. 
 
Conclusion  
 The research findings here are inconclusive regarding recessionary effects on ISMS 
development. However, this research has also revealed the extent to which many 
advanced economies have been falling well behind those in the Pacific Rim and 
particular parts of Europe in terms of protecting organisational data. Pre-2005 
legislation encouraged organisational compliance but recently North America and 
most of Europe seem to have preferred a free market approach to ISMS development. 
  By contrast, an impression is created that Taiwan and Japan are more “hands on”, 
seeking to utilise academic models to help educate organisations so they can engage 
with ISMS complexity. In Japan, Tanaka et al (2005) provided some thought-
provoking analysis regarding the financial implications of good security in the use of 
e-government. One wonders about the impact of this paper in terms of the subsequent 
encouraging ISO27001 accreditation in that country. In Taiwan, an educational 
maturity model (ISEMM) has been developed to assist organisations develop ISMS 
expertise (Chiang et al, 2008), and the expertise developed is being shared (Ku et al, 
2009). The Austro-Hungarian effect is also worthy of investigation, to see if the same 
drivers are working as in the Pacific Rim. Academics perhaps underestimate the 
influence that they can have on policy making. The effects of good national leadership 
in encouraging improved ISMSs and organisational ISO27001 certification and would 
appear to be self-evident, but economic drivers are also identified as important. 
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Appendix 1: Summary of the UK Data Protection Act 1998 
 
 
 
 
Summary of the Data Protection Act 1998 
 
The Data Protection Act sets out eight protection principles which form the legislative 
framework and with which a data controller must comply. 
1st: Personal data shall be processed fairly and lawfully. 
2nd: Personal data shall be obtained only for one or more specified and lawful 
purposes. 
3rd: Personal data shall be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the 
purpose or purposes for which they are processed. 
4th: Personal data shall be accurate and where necessary, kept up to date. 
5th: Personal data processed for any purpose shall not be kept for longer than is 
necessary for that purpose. 
6th: Personal data shall be processed in accordance with the rights of data subjects 
under the Act. 
7th: Appropriate technical and organizational measures shall be taken against 
unauthorized or unlawful processing of personal data and against accidental loss or 
destruction of or damage to personal data. 
8th: Personal data shall not be transferred to a country or territory outside the 
European Economic Area… 
 
Interpretation of the 7th principle 
 
The Seventh Principle of the Act states that "appropriate technical and organizational 
measures" must be taken to protect personal data, and gives advice on appropriate 
security measures.  
 
 
 
